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JOHN E. RILEY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, J 
vs. 
DONNA L. RILEY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050386-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner is appealing from a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce in the Second District Court in the Second District Court in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah, dated March 28,2005. The Honorable Thomas L. Kay following a bench trial 
made the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Petitioner has adequately set forth the issues on appeal and the applicable 
standard of review. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
UCA § 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an 
order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including 
expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its 
discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, 
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party 
and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be 
amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
UCA § 30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and 
parent-time - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(1) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, 
or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current 
addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the 
court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by 
modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and 
other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among 
other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter. 
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(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation 
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the 
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's 
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to 
the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (I) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable 
at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of 
the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
-5-
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death 
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The ruling of the trial court is entitled to a presumption of validity. The findings of 
the trial court are supported by the evidence presented at the trial. Petitioner has failed to 
marshal the evidence and show that all of the evidence in favor of the findings could not 
possibly support the findings made. Because the findings are not against the weight of the 
evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Respondent alimony in the 
amount of $900.00 per month. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in making 
a non-equal division of the marital property rights in Respondent's retirement assets. 
The decision of the trial court is supported by the law, which specifically allows the 
court to consider fault as well as the relative contributions of the parties to Petitioner's 
earning capacity in setting alimony and dividing marital property. 
Finally, the court's award of attorney's fees was supported by the evidence. The court 
appropriately considered needs and abilities in fashioning that award. Other factors were 
considered by the court as well. Such consideration was not inappropriate. There is ample 
evidence justifying the court's award. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner has adequately set forth the nature of this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner has set forth his statement of facts, including references to testimony at trial. 
Respondent's position is that Petitioner has not marshaled all of the evidence in support of 
the findings of the trial court. Respondent's arguments are set forth in the Argument portion 
of this brief and are not itemized here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $900 PER MONTH OR IN ORDERING AN 
UNEQUAL DIVISION OF RESPONDENT'S RETIREMENT 
A, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF 
CORRECTNESS 
The decision of the trial court is entitled to the presumption of correctness absent a 
showing of manifest injustice or a clear abuse of discretion. This court has stated: 
"Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Whitehead v. Whitehead, 
836 P.2d 814,816 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Trial courts have broad discretion in 
making custody determinations, see Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922,923 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), awarding alimony, see Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 
423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and in awarding attorney fees, see Rudman v. 
Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Where the trial court may 
exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision 
absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . 
discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055,1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Childs v. ChUds, 967 P.2d 942, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 8; 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 84, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
In a similar vein is the case of Davis v. Davis: 
"We afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.1 
Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property division 
determination in a divorce action fonly if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.15' 
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Davis v. Davis, 2003 Ut App 282; 76 P.3d 716; 479 Utah Adv. Rep. 6; 2003 
Utah App. LEXIS 82, (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
Petitioner has not shown that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error. Petitioner has not shown that the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings of the court. Petitioner has not shown that such 
a serious inequity resulted from the court's findings and decree that there is manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Petitioner has only shown that if the court had chosen to believe his 
version of the facts, ignore his credibility problems, and look to only one subsection of the 
statute, it may have or could have arrived at different findings and conclusions. This matter, 
however, is one where the court properly applied the entire section of the code dealing with 
alimony and property division, discounted Petitioner's version of events and circumstances 
based on his serious lack of credibility, and considered all relevant information in properly 
determining alimony, dividing marital property and awarding attorney's fees. 
B. PETITIONER MUST MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT BELOW AND THEN SHOW THAT THE COURT'S FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER COULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY THAT 
EVIDENCE 
Petitioner must marshal the evidence, both for and against his position and then show 
that even in the weight of that evidence the trial court could not make the findings it did. In 
the case of State of Utah v. Matthew Stephen Shipp the Supreme Court has recently stated 
this requirement as follows: 
On the first issue of whether a juror failed to answer a voir dire question 
truthfully, we review the court's decision under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). "To show clear error, the 
[contesting party] must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an 
attack." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). 
State of Utah v. Matthew Stephen Shipp, 2005 UT 35; 2005 Utah LEXIS 74 (Utah 
2005) 
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This requirement can also be stated as follows: 
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in valuing and dividing 
the marital estate. The trial court entered findings regarding the value of the 
marital property, which defendant now claims are in error. However, in order 
to challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the challenger "must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in question." Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n.l (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis added). We 
will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropriately 
marshal all of the evidence. Allred v. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087,1090 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508; 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; 1996 Utah App. 
LEXIS 41, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (footnote omitted) 
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence in this case to demonstrate that said 
evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. Respondent, on the other hand, has 
set forth below examples of ample evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the 
trial court. 
C. PETITIONER'S NEEDS AND ABILITIES WERE APPROPRIATELY 
CONSIDERED 
Factors to be considered by a trial court in awarding alimony are set forth in UCA § 
30-3-5. The court, in its findings stated: 
In determining issues of division of marital property, debt, alimony and 
attorneys fees, the Court relies upon the following statutes: 
A. UCA 30-3-5(8)(e), which states: 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts 
of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property 
and in determining the amount of alimony. If one's spouse earnings 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the Court may make a compensation adjustment 
in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
B. UCA 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) providing that the Court may consider, as a factor: 
whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase 
in the payor spouses skill by paying for education received by 
the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school 
during the marriage. 
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C. UCA 30-3-5(8)(b) which provides that the Court "may consider the fault of the 
parties in determining alimony." 
D. UCA 30-3-5(8)(a), setting forth the usual and customary factors of needs, 
ability to produce income, ability to contribute, length of the marriage, etc. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 9, paragraph 24, (R. 257/9). 
Together with consideration of these statutory provisions, the court considered the 
evidence presented and made appropriate findings. The court specifically found that Mr. 
Riley's gross monthly income approached $7,000.00. (R. 257/5). This income gave him an 
ability to pay alimony. The court further found that Mrs. Riley's monthly gross income was 
$4,153.00. (R. 257/6). The court found that Mrs. Riley's monthly expenses were $4,491.00. 
(R. 257/7). The court found that Mr. Riley's expenses were set forth at $4,655.00 but that 
$750 of that was for food and entertainment. (R. 257/7). Furthermore, judging the veracity 
of Mr. Riley, the court found that his actual ability to pay alimony was greater than these 
figures indicated because he had overstated his expenses. (R. 257/7). 
Mr. Riley alleges error because the trial judge did not choose to believe his itemization 
of expenses and the setting forth of his income on a trial exhibit. There was, however, ample 
evidence to support the court's findings. 
As to his ability to pay alimony, the record shows that Mr. Riley had a B.S. Degree 
in aviation management and by his testimony could do anything in the aviation industry 
including such things as piloting or managing an airport (R. 298/9). His current position is 
that of Senior Captain at Express Jet Airlines (R. 298/13). His December 30,2004 paycheck 
showed a year to date gross income of $54,288.00 plus retroactive pay of approximately 
$17,000.00 for an increase in pay on his union contract. (R. 298/29-30). Mr. Riley's 2004 
W-2 showed gross income of $82,193.19, including the $17,000 of retroactive pay, a 9% -
11% increase. (R. 298/32,65). The testimony also included his statements as to guaranteed 
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increases in his pay over the course of the union contract. He first testified that he expected 
pay of $67,720.00 (R. 298/33). However, under cross examination, the testimony was that 
he expected his 2005 income to be $73.28 per hour. (R. 298/189). The evidence showed that 
he was guaranteed a 3% increase over next four years. (R. 298/ 35,190). Furthermore, there 
is a possibility of another retroactive pay adjustment for increases to be negotiated by his 
union four years down the road. That is, of course, uncertain at this point. (R. 298/66,112). 
Mr Rileyfs income would continue for approximately 12 more years. (R. 298/35). 
In addition to his salary, Mr. Riley received a disability check from the Veteran's 
Administration. There was disputed evidence on the amount of the check after the divorce 
and with other dependents added. (R. 298/ 38-39). The amount was $414 and may be 
decreased with the divorce, but may be increased with the addition of another child. ( R. 
298/60,109-110). Petitioner also receives aper diem from his employer, an untaxed benefit, 
which in 2004 totaled $4,000.00, or $300 to $400 per month (R. 298/ 80) 
Summing up his income on cross examination, Mr. Riley testified that he expected 
a gross salary of $6,232 a month, $414 from his VA benefit, and $300 to $400per diem, for 
a gross monthly income of approximately $7,000.00. (R. 298/110). This evidence is 
sufficient to justify the court's findings on income and ability. 
The court's finding that Mr. Riley's gross monthly income, from which the court could 
then determine his ability to pay alimony, was $6,800.00 per month. Though Mr. Riley 
would have preferred the court to set his income at $6,156.00 gross per month pursuant to 
his exhibit, it is certainly not against the weight of the evidence for the court to have done 
otherwise. Mr. Riley has not demonstrated that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings made by the court. 
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Mr. Riley testified of his monthly expenses. He testified that he had court ordered 
support of $470 for his illegitimate child and that in addition he voluntarily paid special 
school expenses of $ 156.11 which expenses were not part of the court ordered support. (R. 
298/40-41). 
In addition, Mr. Riley testified he had a federal tax deduction of $770. (R. 298/44). 
He had social security, medicare, union dues which amount to 2% of his income. (R. 
298/45). He paid a 401(k) loan of $150 per month. (R. 298/45). His mortgage was $1165. 
(R. 298/45). Mr. Riley further testified that he believed his house payment was $40-$50 
more per month because of damage to his credit score caused by Mrs. Riley. (R. 298/99). 
He had a new car with a payment of $575 per month. (R. 298/46). Car insurance was 
expensive in the Houston area and would cost him $300 more per year there than here. (R. 
298/50). He testified of a debt payment to Bank of America of $ 100 per month on his VISA. 
(R. 298/51). He also testified of two debts to Wells Fargo and Provident which were low or 
no interest unsecured loans resulting from the deficiency on the sale of the house. (R. 
298/52). He pays $630 per year to the homeowner's association for his townhouse. (R. 
298/52). He has life insurance premiums of $94 per month. (R. 298/53). Mr. Riley's 
testimony was that his relocation to Houston would result in a higher cost of living. (R. 
298/42). 
Petitioner acknowledged that he had been paying $900.00 per month to Mrs. Riley 
pursuant to the temporary order of the court. (R. 298/49-50). He further acknowledged that 
Respondent had debts similar to his debts. (R. 298/54). 
Upon challenge to his expenses, Mr. Riley indicated that he did not use his per diem 
for hotels because those expenses were paid by his employer. (R. 298/90). He indicated that 
his per diem was not income because it was not taxed ( R.298/81) and acknowledged that his 
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food bill was high because he preferred to eat out even when at home 3-4 days per week. (R. 
298/82). 
The court found that Mr. Riley had $2,000.00 per month after his expenses. 
Furthermore, the judge found that the expenses were inflated. (R. 257/ 7). Even viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Petitioner's claim that the judge overlooked deductions 
from gross income of $1,565.00, that leaves $435.00 for the payment of the $900 alimony 
with the other $465.00 to be made up from inflated expenses. 
Even though Petitioner has pointed out what he considers to be evidence that the 
court's finding of his ability to pay was not appropriate, he has not demonstrated that the 
finding was against the clear weight of the evidence. This is especially the case when the 
court went out of its way to point out that Mr. Riley's credibility and veracity were seriously 
in question. In a case of the same vein, this court has stated: 
We find no error in the trial court's failure to make a specific finding regarding 
defendant's income in this circumstance. The trial court found that defendant 
was not being candid as to his actual current income or was purposefully 
underemployed. We defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of 
the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465,123 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 31, 31 (Ct. App. 1989). Given the evidence in the record, it was 
well within the court's discretion to determine that defendant was either 
earning more than the evidence indicated or had the ability to earn more 
money. We therefore will not disturb the trial court's alimony award. 
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530; 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 1990 Utah 
App. LEXIS 46, (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
In this case, the court made very specific findings as to the credibility of Mrs. Riley 
and the lack of credibility of Mr. Riley. The trial court's finding number 2 is as follows: 
The Court is called upon to make a ruling on important issues. In deciding 
these issues, the Court relies heavily upon its perceptions of credibility. This 
case turns on credibility issues - the credibility of the parties themselves. The 
Court's findings regarding credibility issues are as follows: 
A. The Court finds it both refreshing and more credible when a witness is asked 
a question that's not going to put them in a good light, or could easily be 
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denied or argued about, and frankly admits what the cross-examiner is telling 
her. 
B. Mrs. Riley was more credible in that respect. She admitted things that should 
have been admitted. She basically seemed credible as she testified. 
C. Unlike Mrs. Riley, Mr. Riley was unwilling to admit facts which should have 
been admitted under cross-examination. 
D. When asked to admit that he had fathered a second child out of wedlock, Mr. 
Riley denied the same but stated on cross-examination that he had put the 
child as an insured on his insurance policy. So, the Court comes to the 
conclusion that either Mr. Riley has fathered a second child out of wedlock, 
or he has defrauded an insurance company. 
E. Mr. Riley also testified that he signed an Affidavit to purchase his home in 
Houston, stating that he was single, when he wasn't. Now, he could justify 
that, because the trial got continued or something else, but the fact of the 
matter is that when somebody signs an affidavit, and it is under oath, and it is 
a lie, that person has, basically, perjured themselves. And, signing an affidavit 
to get a home, saying you were single when you weren't, wasn't a true 
statement. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2, paragraph 2, (R. 257/2-3). 
D. RESPONDENT'S NEEDS AND ABILITIES WERE APPROPRIATELY 
CONSIDERED 
The court found that Respondent had a gross monthly income of $4,153.00. The court 
received Respondent's tax records and found that her additional income was minimal, 
actually showing a loss every year except 2003, in which year she earned $878.00. (R. 
257/6). Further the court found that her monthly expenses were $4,491.00. (R. 257/6). 
These findings are supported by the evidence received by the court. 
Respondent has a Masters Degree. (R. 298/12). She is an Associate Director of the 
State's Division of Child and Family Services by Petitioner's testimony. (R. 298/12). By 
Respondent's testimony, she is now a Program Manager with the Department of Human 
Services. (R. 298/147). Petitioner estimated her income at probably $50,000. (R. 298/110-
111). Petitioner's 2004 W-2 showed gross income of $48,314. (R. 298/144,166). Her 2003 
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W-2 showed gross income of $45,952.38. (R. 298/167). This represented a 4% increase 
2003 over 2004. (R. 298/167). She recently obtained a new position with less than a dollar 
an hour increase in pay. (R. 298/167). She will receive a 1% cost of living adjustment 
which, with increased costs of benefits, did not increase her bottom much. (R. 298/167). 
Her additional income is periodic and not certain. (R. 298/145). Adoption home 
studies may bring in additional monies. In 2004 she did 12 home studies with gross income 
of $375.00 each. (R. 298/168, 172). Some business losses reflect non-cash expenses. (R. 
298/169-170). She did receive some additional income from University of Phoenix in 2003, 
$2000 from teaching. (R. 298/171-172). In 2002 and 2003, she did some work on federal 
boards. (R. 298/182). Her current take home pay is $2,684 per month. (R. 298/187). That 
take home pay is after a 401(k) contribution. (R. 298/188). 
Respondent's needs were not estimated but were determined by actual expenses over 
last six months. (R. 298/146-148). She had installment payments of $1,085. (R. 298/149). 
She did have estimated payments on the short sale of the marital house of $280 per month. 
(R. 298/149). Though he seeks to now raise a challenge to certain of Respondent's expenses, 
Mr. Riley did not challenge those expenses below. Mrs. Riley's exhibit of expenses was 
received by the court without objection. She was cross examined on the issue of her business 
expenses and such creative accounting devices as deducting business use of her vehicle, a 
home office and depreciation. (R. 298/168-171). She was also asked regarding furniture 
purchases at RC Willey. (R. 298/174-175). The court's finding that she had monthly 
expenses of $4,491.00 is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
II. THE COURT'S FINDING OF FAULT AND ITS CONSIDERATION OF FAULT 
ARE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
The court made clear that the issue of fault played a part in the alimony decision and 
in the property division. This is completely in accord with the statutes. Petitioner argues that 
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the trial court may consider fault but" . . . it can only do so after addressing the musts in the 
statute. The Court 'must1 find that the Respondent has a need for alimony and that the 
Petitioner had the ability to pay. It is only after both of these findings are met that the trial 
court can consider the fault of one of the parties." Brief of Appellant, page 27. The statute 
does not require one before the other. Subsection (a) of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, requires the court to consider, at least the factors concerned with needs and 
abilities. Then, subsection (b) allows the court to consider fault. Subsection (c) is another 
"shall", requiring the court to consider all relevant facts and equitable principles. Subsection 
(d) then goes on to allow the court, under appropriate circumstances, to attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. Finally, subsection (e) speaks right on point to the 
case at bar and is another "shall" indicating that where a marriage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in determining alimony. 
Petitioner asserts that the "shalls" of subsection (a) somehow outweigh the "shalls" 
of subsections (c) and (e) and the "mays" of subsections (b) and (d). This is without support 
in the statute itself or in the case law. This court has held that it is not error to consider fault 
in determining alimony: 
Mr. Madsen also contends it was error for the trial to consider fault in 
awarding alimony to Mrs. Madsen. He contends a trial court may not consider 
fault in awarding alimony because the purpose of alimony is to provide spousal 
support, not to punish either of the parties. See English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409,411 (Utah 1977) . While it is true that Utah courts have consistently held 
that the purpose of alimony is for spousal support, the Utah Legislature has 
recently enacted a statute stating that trial courts "may consider fault of the 
parties in determining alimony." Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp. 1998) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the cases cited by appellant which pre-date the statute 
are inapposite and the trial court acted within its discretion in considering Mr. 
Madsen's acts of violence which lead to the destruction of the marriage. 
Madsen v. Madsen, 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 180, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
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In Childs v. Childs, this court looked at the issue of a reduction of alimony for the 
receiving spouse because of her fault and found that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
reducing her alimony based upon fault. 
The trial court specifically found that Heather earns approximately {967 P.2d 
947} $ 840 gross per month and that she has reasonable monthly expenses of 
$ 1,250. The trial court also found that Brad earns approximately $ 3,300 gross 
per month and has reasonable monthly expenses of $ 2,500. The court found 
that $ 350 per month was appropriate considering "the duration of the 
marriage, [Heather's] excellent health, youth, and ability to improve her 
capacity to meet her own needs, and her fault in engaging in an extra-marital 
affair." The trial court's findings clearly show that the trial court considered all 
four of the required factors and expressly noted factors it considered in 
limiting the alimony award. Heather, however, does not challenge the trial 
court's findings or any basis relied upon by the trial court to limit the alimony 
award. She only argues that $350 is insufficient to meet her needs, but that $ 
500 would be sufficient-without any argument or support for this figure. 
Because Heather has failed to prove serious inequity in the alimony amount, 
we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding her $ 350 per 
month. 
Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942; 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 8; 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 
84, (Utah Ct.App. 1998) 
Including fault considerations in the division of property is also appropriate. The Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed a lower court's Divorce Decree in the case of Dubois v. Dubois. 
The husband in that case challenged the division of the property, the payment of alimony and 
attorney's fees. The Supreme Court approved the trial court's use of its discretion: 
The defendant assigns as error a failure of the court to take into consideration 
the plaintiffs interest in the estate of Dr. Hirth and whatever expectancy she 
may have in the estate of her mother who is still living but of advanced age. 
It is quite evident that the court in its decision took into account the 
source {29 Utah 2d 77} of the assets which comprised the marital estate 
and also the fact that the plaintiff was without fault in the termination of 
the marriage. We are unable to say that the court abused its discretion in the 
division of the property of the marriage and awarding attorney's fees to the 
plaintiff in the amount specified. 
Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75; 504 P.2d 1380; 1973 Utah LEXIS 723, 
(Utah 1973) (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted) 
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Even though the alimony award may impinge on Mr. Riley's lifestyle, that does not 
make it punitive and does not prohibit it. This court, in the case of Christiansen v. 
Christiansen stated: 
"The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony." Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(b). Considering the fault of a party is distinct from 
punishing a party based on fault. See Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 2003 UT 
App 282, P 9 n.l, 479 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 . In this case, the trial court made 
sufficient findings, based on the evidence presented, to support the alimony 
award. Husband's argument that the alimony award is a "penalty" imposed on 
him, and a "reward" given to Wife, is not supported by the trial court's 
findings. Fault may correctly be considered by the trial court without 
penalizing the party found to be at fault. Accordingly, the trial court's award 
of alimony to continue for five years after Wife's remarriage is not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Husband's final objection to the alimony award is that it exceeds Wife's 
established need. "The spouse's demonstrated need must. . . constitute the 
maximum permissible alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court in this case made an implicit 
finding that Wife's expenses were reasonable. To wit, the findings of fact state 
that Wife "needs about $ 2,100 per month in addition to her own takeliome 
income in order to make ends meet." While the court attempted to raise Wife's 
standard of living to that which the parties enjoyed during the marriage, it 
stated that Husband could not expect to maintain the standard he enjoyed 
because it included extravagant trips with a mistress and other expenditures 
related to his extramarital affair. At the same time, Wife lived in a 
one-bedroom condominium with the parties' four children. 
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2003 UT App 348; 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 412, 
(Ut Ct. App, 2003) 
Mr. Riley's claim that the court can consider fault but not beyond the specific needs 
of the spouse not at fault is contrary to the statute and doesn't follow the cases previously 
decided by this court. In reality, that position makes subsection (b) of the statute useless. It 
further ignores the requirement of subsection (c) that the court consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles. It would totally eliminate consideration of subsection (e), the collective 
contributions of the marital partners to one partner's significantly increased earning ability. 
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III. THE ALIMONY AWARD AND PROPERTY DIVISION ARE APPROPRIATE 
BASED UPON THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PETITIONER'S INCOME 
UCA § 30-3-5(8)(e) discusses the special circumstance where one spouse has a very 
significant increase in income due to the collective efforts of both parties. The statute 
specifically requires the court to consider that change both in dividing marital property and 
in determining alimony. 
In this particular case, the court found that Mr. Riley benefitted in his personal 
happiness and his career opportunities by leaving the military and becoming a commercial 
airline pilot. The court found that Mr. Riley was unhappy and that the family made a plan 
for him to leave the military, receive further education and training and pursue a career of 
his choosing. (R. 257/3-4). The evidence was disputed as to the actual reason for his leaving 
the military, but the finding of the court is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Mr. Riley had a very substantial increase in income at Express Jet, starting at $ 18.16 
per hour and moving up to $67.72 per hour. (R. 298/27-28). At the time of the marriage, Mr. 
Riley was earning $ 17,000.00 per year in the military plus a housing allowance. (R. 298/62). 
Mr. Riley always wanted to be a pilot. (R. 298/ 61). His financial contribution to the joint 
efforts to meet his goals was minimal. (R. 298/63). Respondent sold her pre-marital duplex 
and used the money for their move to Utah for his career not her Masters Degree. (R. 
298/63, 132). Petitioner did put a lot of work into the duplex. (R. 298/93). Last year and 
retroactively, Petitioner had an 11% pay increase. (R. 298/65). Petitioner is happier now. 
(R. 298/89). Respondent is devastated that her sacrifices did not result in comfort planned 
on. (R. 298/122, 134). The family's plans were for his career. (R. 298/118-119). 
Respondent withdrew investment funds three times in furtherance of the family's plan, first 
$3 8,863.29 which would have a current value $92,993; second $6,824.26 which would have 
a current value of $8,266.89; and third, $18,226 which would have a current value of 
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$22,752.40 (R. 298/125-126). These withdrawals were a hardship, to get the family by and 
get Petitioner into his career. (R. 298/134). There were struggles while he was in school. 
(R. 298/139). Petitioner contributed money from his military severance to the family budget. 
(R. 298/156). Petitioner worked some side jobs and contributed to the family budget. (R. 
298/63). The move to Utah cost $10,000 and was largely for Petitioner's career. (R. 
298/157). Petitioner contributed his VA stipend of $700 to $900 to the family budget. (R. 
298/161). Petitioner left the army for a new life. (R. 298/193). 
It is completely appropriate under the "shall" requirement of UCA § 30-3-5(8)(e) for 
the court to ". . . make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony" (emphasis supplied) in this case. Not only are there needs of Respondent 
and ability of Petitioner, as demonstrated above, there is Petitioner's fault in the divorce and 
there is also this compensating adjustment to be considered in both the award of alimony and 
the division of property. 
In the Christiansen case, cited above, the court specifically allowed the award of a 
piece of property to the wife even though by doing so, the division of property was unequal. 
Husband also claims that the trial court's division of the marital estate was 
inequitable. In Utah, marital assets should be divided equally, absent 
exceptional circumstances. See Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, P 22, 
987 P.2d 603 (stating "each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent 
of the marital property" (quotations and citations omitted)). "We afford the 
trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, 
and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.'" Davis, 2003 UT App 
282 at P 8 (citations omitted). 
The trial court acknowledged that the property division was not 
mathematically equal but was justified based on the facts of this case. 
Nevertheless, Husband argues that awarding Wife a 100% interest in the 
Fairview cabin was error. The court made this award based on Husband's 
dissipation of the marital estate. The court was unable to ascertain Husband's 
income and worth, due to Husband's scuttling of his law practice, his 
commingling of funds, and his frivoling away of substantial funds belonging 
to the marital estate. Given the trial court's findings of fact, we conclude there 
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was no abuse of discretion in awarding Wife more than half of the martial 
assets. 
In this case, the trial court acknowledged that the division of Respondents pension 
was not equal. The court specifically cited UCA § 30-3-5(8)(e) and noted that no Woodward 
portion was awarded to Mr. Riley because of the money Petitioner had given up through 
conversion of her earlier retirement assets in order to benefit the home, the family and Mr. 
Riley's career. (R. 257/11) 
This division is not against the weight of the evidence and is appropriate. It achieves 
the major goal of a property division which is to be fair, just and equitable. 
In dividing a marital estate, the trial court has considerable discretion to enter 
equitable orders concerning property distribution. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 
116,131 Utah Adv. Rep. 88,89 (Ct. App. 1990); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 
408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Such orders will not be disturbed so long as 
the trial court exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set by 
this state's appellate courts, Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 89; Weston, 773 
P.2d at 410, "except where to do so would work a manifest injustice or 
inequity." Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373 (quoting Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117,119 
(Utah 1986)). The major purpose of a property division, in conjunction 
with an alimony award, "is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result 
between the parties." Id. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421; 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 59; 1990 Utah App. 
LEXIS 94, (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis supplied) 
Together with the alimony award, the division of property is just and fair under the 
unique circumstances of this case. It is a reasonable attempt to balance and take into account 
Mr. Rileyfs huge change in income, his happiness and new life, the devastation of Mrs. Riley, 
and her significant contribution to Mr. Riley's ability to enjoy his new life and career. 
Interestingly, Mr. Riley argued below that the award to Mrs. Riley of her pension free and 
clear of any claim by him would be an appropriate compensation for his fault in ending this 
marriage. (R. 298/222). Of course, he meant it to be without any alimony, whatsoever. 
However, the statute specifically speaks to alimony and property division. The court made 
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appropriate findings based upon the evidence and correctly applied the law to this case. The 
findings are based upon the evidence presented and the result is equitable. In looking at the 
entirety of the situation, the relative contributions of the parties to Mr. Rileyfs career, earning 
potential and retirements of the parties, the trial court's decision is supported by and is a 
logical extension of the evidence presented. 
IV. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS APPROPRIATE 
UCA § 30-3-3 allows a trial court, in its discretion, to order one party to pay the 
other's costs and attorney's fees in a domestic matter. The courts have interpreted this statute, 
generally, to require a showing of need and ability to pay in exercising that discretion. 
Nothing in the statute prohibits other considerations. The case law does not preclude such 
other considerations. The court in the case at bar did consider needs and abilities and it also 
considered fault. The court's findings and award of alimony are supported by the evidence 
and are appropriate. 
The trial court in this case extensively reviewed the parties' incomes and expenses. 
Based upon their incomes and expenses, the court found there was a need on Respondent's 
part for both alimony and attorney's fees. (R. 257/9-10, 13). The court received proffers 
from Mr. Riley's counsel as to his attorney's fees in the matter and then received an Affidavit 
of Attorney's Fees from Mrs. Riley's counsel. (R. 298/194). 
Both counsel proffered the reasonableness of their respective attorney's fees and 
neither counsel was heard to object to the reasonableness of the fees incurred by the other 
party. 
The court fashioned the award of attorney's fees specifically based upon Mr. Riley's 
ability to pay, ordering only half of the requested fees and providing a payment plan over 
time. (R. 257/13-14). When questioned by Petitioner's counsel, the trial judge indicated that 
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the award of fees was " .. .based on two things. One, I'm saying the attorney's fees would 
never had to been incurred had there not been adultery in this situation. And so if you want 
to say that's at fault or whatever else. On the second ground I'm saying that based upon 
evidence I believe he has the ability to pay it and she has a need for it." (R. 298/248). 
This court in the case of Rudman v. Rudman discussed the award of attorney's fees: 
The decision to award fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
but, as with alimony awards, the decision must be based on evidence of 
financial need and reasonableness. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We will 
reverse an award of attorney fees and costs when either financial need or 
reasonableness has not been shown. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,426 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73; 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 36; 1991 Utah App. 
LEXIS 68, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
This court will reverse an award of attorney's fees when either financial need or 
reasonableness has not been shown. This court has not held, however, that an award of 
attorney's fees will be reversed when the trial court has taken into account additional factors 
such as fault. The Rudman court noted that an award of attorney's fees is comparable to 
alimony. That consideration is appropriate in this case. The trial court in fact referred to its 
specific findings in that area in awarding attorney's fees. (R. 257/13). Petitioner claims, yet 
has provided no support for his argument, that the court cannot consider additional factors 
in awarding attorney's fees. Petitioner's argument is without merit. This court has held that 
".. .[t]he failure to consider any of the enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee 
issue. . ." Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508; 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; 1996 Utah App. 
LEXIS 41, (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court has not held that the consideration of additional 
factors is inappropriate. 
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In this case, the court obviously felt strongly that Respondent's fees were incurred 
because of Petitioner's actions and that, but for those actions, there would have been no 
attorney's fees incurred. Nevertheless, this was not the basis for the award. Respondent's 
award of attorney's fees was properly based upon permissible enumerated factors as set forth 
in the cases cited above. 
V. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent, if she prevails on appeal, should receive her attorney's fees on appeal. 
Generally, when fees in a divorce case are granted to the prevailing party at the 
trial court, and that party in turn prevails on appeal, then fees will also be 
awarded on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,494 (Utah App. 1991). In this 
case, if the trial court determines that plaintiff is still entitled to attorney fees 
after considering the above enumerated factors, because she prevailed on the 
central issue on appeal, the entry of defendant's default, she shall be awarded 
her attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal. See id. This amount shall 
be determined on remand. 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P. 2d 508; 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; 1996 Utah App. 
LEXIS 41, (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The Bell Court stated it as follows: 
Wife seeks an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. "Ordinarily, when 
fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party who then prevails on appeal, 
fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because Wife was awarded attorney fees below, 
a result that is not likely to change on remand although the amount may differ, 
and because she has prevailed on the main issue on appeal, we award her 
attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand. 
5e//v.5e//,810P.2d489; 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 33; 1991 Utah App. LEXIS 58 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case made a reasonable decision based upon all of the evidence 
presented by the parties. The findings of the court upon which it based its decision are 
supported by the evidence. The trial court's decision is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and should not be disturbed unless Petitioner, upon marshaling the evidence in 
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support of the findings, can demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support those 
findings. 
Petitioner failed in this burden. Though the court disagreed with his interpretation of 
the evidence and made findings Petitioner disagreed with, he has not shown that the findings 
are unsupported by the evidence. 
The law supports the decision of the trial court. Petitioner has asked this court to 
overturn the alimony decreed by the trial court because it goes beyond Respondent's needs. 
He relies on one subsection of the statute and simply ignores all other provisions of the 
statute, provisions which the court in its findings specifically considered. Those same 
provisions deal with an unequal property division as a "compensating adjustment". The very 
specific and detailed findings of the court show its consideration of "all relevant facts and 
equitable principles" in making its alimony award and property division. In addition to 
considering the requirements of needs and abilities as set forth in subsection (a) of UCA § 
30-3-5(8), the court considered all factors together. This is best stated by the court itself in 
its findings, number 22: 
The Court finds that the facts of this case justify consideration of Mr. Riley's fault. 
The Court deems it necessary to consider that factor in fairness to Mrs. Riley. It 
is not the Court's intent to apply strict punitive measures so as to unfairly or 
inequitably burden Mr. Riley. Nevertheless, Mrs. Riley is entitled to certain relief 
based upon her needs, Mr. Riley's ability to pay, his fault, the efforts of Mrs. 
Riley in furthering his career, and the sacrifice/liquidation of her pre-marital assets 
in order to further his career opportunities. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 9, paragraph 22. (R. 257/9). 
For the same reasons, i.e.: needs, abilities and all the relevant factors of this case, 
Respondent is entitled to the award of attorney's fees made by the court and that award 
should not be disturbed. She should also be awarded the additional attorney's fees incurred 
on appeal. 
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Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court's findings are not supported by the 
evidence which the court heard. The law supports the trial court's findings and decision. 
The trial court's decision was within its discretion and should not be overturned by this court. 
DATED this 1 1 day of November, 2005. 
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